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H. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A. The State has Failed to Address the Argument that the Perry Fundamental
Error Analysis is Inapplicable in this Case
Mr. Pulsifer has argued that the appropriate standard of review in this case is abuse of
discretion per State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 777, 229 P.3d 379,382 (Ct. App. 2009), rev.

denied (2010), and not the fundamental error analysis of State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P .3d
961 (2010). Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 6-7. The State has not responded to this specific
argument, but rather assumed that the standard of review is fundamental error and argued that
relief on appeal should be denied because Mr. Pulsifer has not established fundamental error.
Respondent's Brief at page 4. The State does not argue that it should prevail under an abuse of
discretion standard. Respondent's Brief at pages 4-11.
In evaluating the appropriate standard of review, a review of the genesis of the Perry
fundamental error standard is useful. Peny 's fundamental error analysis is based upon the
federal plain error standard. 150 Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at 997. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-78 (1993). According to Perry, to establish plain error
under the federal rule, three requirements must be met. First, the defendant must have had one of
his or her rights violated, a right which he did not waive. Id. at 732-33, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. (Note
that waiver is different from forfeiture. Forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a
right while waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Id.,
quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 68 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938).) Second, the error
must be "plain" which means "clear" or ''obvious." Id at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 177. And, third, the
error must affect substantial rights, meaning (in most cases) that it affected the outcome of the

trial court proceedings. Id 1
The purpose of the federal plain eITor doctrine is discussed in Wright and Miller's Federal
Practice and Procedure:
Clearly a part of the purpose of the plain error rule is to protect the defendant. If a
serious injustice was done him it should be remedied. For this purpose courts
have consistently recognized that the strength or weakness of the evidence against
him [is] relevant. But this does not exhaust the purpose of the rule. Instead the
court is to act if there were errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. It is important that justice be done but it
is also important the justice seem to be done. Even those guilty of the most
heinous offenses are entitled to a fair trial. It is not a miscarriage of justice to
convict a guilty man, but if he is convicted in a way inconsistent with the fairness
and integrity of judicial proceedings, then the courts should invoke the plain error
rule in order to protect their own public reputation.
The Plain Error Rule, 3B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 856 (3 rd ed.). (Footnotes and internal
quotation marks omitted.)
In accord with these goals of both the protection of the defendant and the protection of
the integrity of the judicial system, Wright notes that while ordinarily plain error review is
invoked by appellate counsel who discover errors not objected to in the trial court, the rule is also
invoked by the appellate courts on their own motion. "Thus, the plain error rule is a departure
from the position usually presupposed by the adversary system that a party must look to his
counsel to protect him and that he must bear the cost of the mistakes of his counsel." Id., citing

This is the description of the federal plain error standard of review set out in the Perry
opinion. However, United States v. Marcus,_ U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 2159 (2010), decided about
seven months before Perry describes a 4-part test: 1) there is an error; 2) the error is clear or
obvious rather that subject to reasonable dispute; 3) the error affected the appellant's substantial
rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings;
and 4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. 130 S.Ct. at 2164, citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 136, 129 S.Ct.
1423, 1429 (2009).
1

2

United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9 th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Powe, 591
F.2d 833, 846-847 (C.A.D.C. 1978), stating that "the trial court can no more stand idly by while
the fundamental rights of a criminal defendant are forfeited through the inaction of ill prepared
counsel than a reviewing court can fail to notice plain errors or defects affecting these substantial
rights."
And, in conformity with its purpose, the plain error standard of review makes an
exception for "structural errors" which might "affect substantial rights" regardless of their actual
impact on an appellant's trial. United States v. Marcus,_ U.S. at_, 130 S.Ct. at 2164-65.

Perry adopted a fundamental error standard of review that is somewhat like the federal
plain error standard, on the basis that Idaho shares the same conflicting concerns in the strong
societal interest in the finality of judgments and in the sense of fundamental justice inherent in
the concept of a fair trial. 150 Idaho at 225-226, 245 P.3d at 977-978. The Perry fundamental
error standard requires:!) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more unwaived
constitutional rights were violated; 2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any
additional inforn1ation not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether
the failure to object was a tactical decision; and 3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of
the trial proceedings. 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P .3d at 978.
After Perry, Jeffrey Bower, a 2012 J.D. candidate, in a law review comment and note,
written with the advice of an attorney from the Ada County Prosecutor's Office, argued that

Perry, "if applied correctly" will allow the appellate courts to swiftly dispose of unmeritorious
appeals." Jeffrey W. Bower, Clarity and Balance: Appellate Review of Harmless Error,

3

Fundamental Error, and Prosecutoria! ,Misconduct After State v. Perry, 48 Idaho L. Rev. 85, 107

(2011 ). See footnote 1 thanking Professor Alan Williams and Jan Bennetts for their insight and
advice. Specifically, the article argued that the requirement that the error be plain upon the
record including a requirement that the record demonstrate that the failure to object was not
tactical should be used "to dispose of frivolous claims expeditiously without engaging in the
discretionary process of determining whether a due process violation has occurred." Id. at 112.
And, this desire to dispose of cases quickly without engaging in a consideration of whether
constitutional rights have been violated is consistent with the state's assumption that Peny
fundamental error should be applied to review of failures of trial courts to complete required sua
sponte actions like ordering a competency evaluation. However, this interpretation of Perry and

its intent is contrary to Idaho's case law both past and present.
While Perry itself does not explain the decision to narrow the Olano plain error review to
require a record demonstrating that the decision to not object was not tactical, it is improbable
that the Idaho Supreme Court intended to allow criminal convictions to stand in the face of
obvious due process errors resulting from the failures of trial courts to carry out established sua
sponte duties designed to guarantee due process without allowing any recourse to a discretionary

review. Indeed, the Perry opinion itself indicates such was not the intent of the Court when it
states:
[w ]here an error has occurred at trial and was not followed by a contemporaneous
objection, such error shall only be reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to
an appellate court that one of his unwaived constitutional rights was plainly
violated. If the defendant meets this burden then an appellate court shall review
the error under the harmless error test, with the defendant bearing the burden of
proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
trial.

4

State v. Peny, 150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d at 978. See also, State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 724,
249 P.3d 1169, 1179 (Ct. App. 20 I 0), noting that "even in cases where an error has not been
properly preserved, an appellate court may remedy that error where the eITor is so fundamental
that it results in the defendant being deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
a fair trial in a fair tribunal."
More recent decisions clarify that the expeditious resolution of appeals is not to be given
precedence over the competing state interest injustice and fair proceedings. State v. Alamaraz,
Idaho

P.3d

, 2012 WL 1948499 (2012), held that even in the case of evidentiary

eITors which may not amount to constitutional violations, discretion still lies with the appellate
court to consider the objection in light of the context in which it was presented, so that an
objection to evidence is sufficient to preserve the question for appeal even if counsel does not
specifically invoke the relevant rule of evidence. State v. Wright,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ ,
2012 WL 2308173 (Ct. App. 2012), held that a prose defendant's question, "May I have these
off, sir?" with regard to restraints was sufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of whether the
district court had abused its discretion in employing the restraints during a jury trial.
It is also of note in discerning the intent of Perry, that Perry continued recognition of

structural eITor - a eITor which affects the entire deliberative process so as to require a reversal as
any harmless eITor inquiry would essentially result in the appellate court itself acting in the role
of the jury. 150 Idaho 224,245 P.3d at 976.
Idaho has long recognized the importance of the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Justice Huntley noted in 1986:
As I suspect is the case with all appellate judges and justices, I sense the public

5

pressure to affirm convictions. However, we have been hired to respect and
protect the integrity of the criminal justice system because such is fundamental to
the ultimate protection of our democratic form of government and thus we should
have the courage to withstand those pressures.
State v. Langley, 110 Idaho 895, 907, 719 P.2d 1155, 1168 (1986) (Huntley, J. dissenting).
And, most recently, in affirming that the Leon 2 good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule does not apply to violations of Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution, the Supreme
Court confirmed in clear terms that concerns for judicial expediency do not outweigh the duty of
the Idaho courts to uphold and honor the rights guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d 483 (2012). Koivu quoted State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43,
254 P. 788 (1927):
Law and court made rules of expediency must not be placed above the
Constitution. If violation of constitutional rights or law is to be condoned,
excused, palliated, overlooked, or if a violation cannot be proved except by a
violation, is it not possible to weigh the various provisions of our Constitution,
and fix them in relative importance, above those of any law? ...
A continued disregard of the rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, and the principles thereof incorporated in state Constitutions, heads
us directly to revolution against their usurpation, if history tells us correctly that
violation of the rights sought to be protected thereby was one of the chief moving
reasons for the Revolution. If, one by one, the rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, can and must, for expediency's sake, be violated, abolished, stricken
from that immortal document, and for state Constitution, we will find ourselves
governed by expediency, not laws or Constitutions, and the revolution will have
come.
I can see no such expediency or necessity for the enforcement of any law as to
justify violation of constitutional rights to accomplish it. The shock to the
sensibilities of the average citizen when his government violates a constitutional
right of another is far more evil in its effect than the escape of any criminal
through the courts' observance of those rights.

2

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
6

152 Idaho at 516, 272 P.3d at 488, quoting State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho at 57-58, 254 P. at 792.

Koivu 's reiteration of the precedence of the protection of constitutional rights over
concerns for expediency is consistent with the application of the Hawkins abuse of discretion
standard of review rather than the Perry fundamental error analysis in Mr. Pulsifer's case because
application of Perry's fundamental error analysis would insulate the district court's sua sponte
duties from appellate oversight and review.
As noted above, the state has made no argument that there was not an abuse of discretion
in the failure of the district court to order a competency evaluation as required by I.C. § 18210-18-212. Based upon the arguments set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief and the lack of
argument to the contrary from the state, this Court should find that there was an abuse of
discretion and apply the remedy applied in State v. Hawkins, supra - that is vacate the judgment
of conviction leaving the state free to re-prosecute if Mr. Pulsifer is later found competent.
B. In the Alternative, this Court Should Find that the Error was Preserved and
Review for an Abuse of Discretion
In the alternative, this Court should find that the error in failing to order a competency
evaluation was preserved and is reviewable for an abuse of discretion.
At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel requested a substance abuse evaluation
pursuant to LC. § 19-2524. Tr. p. 10, In. 4. The Court did not verbally respond to this request,
Tr. p. 10, however, the Court did order a substance abuse assessment under I.C. § 19-2524 in its
written order for a PSI. R 70. And, this assessment was made on July 14, 2011, by Kelly
Smothers. PSI p. 24-31.
At the first sentencing hearing, counsel asked for a continuance in order to get a ''mental

7

health evaluation." The request was:
... As mentioned in the presentcncc investigation report, Mr. Pulsifer suffered a
car accident within the last year and had spent some time in a coma. It's come to
my attention just last Friday that he may have suffered some brain damage during
that time that is concerning to his friends and family and may be causing some
lingering issues in the mental health department. We are asking that the court not
only continue, but also order a mental health evaluation so that we can hopefully
try and determine the extent of any impairment that may have happened and
whether he is in need of any current mental health treatment.
Tr. p. 12, In. 22 - p. 13, In. 8.
In response, the court stated that it would order an evaluation and then asked if Mr.
Pulsifer was able to pay for the evaluation himself. Tr. p. 14, In. 8-9. The Court did not respond
to Mr. Pulsifer' s statement that he could pay for an evaluation himself but rather implicitly
ordered it at state expense and when the prosecutor asked if it would be subject to reimbursement
the court stated that the department never bills for the evaluations. Tr. p. 14, In. 8 - p. 15, In. 22. 3
This exchange preserved for appeal the question of whether the district court erred in not
ordering a competency evaluation. Per Alamaraz and Wright, supra, the context of the request
for an evaluation is to be considered.
While counsel used the words "mental health," she also told the court that the evaluation
was appropriate because of prior brain damage and the need to "determine the extent of any
impairment." Taken in context, as allowed by Alamaraz, it is clear that counsel was expressing
concerns about Mr. Pulsifer's competency and requesting an evaluation for competency.

Alamaraz, supra. If the statement "May I have these off, sir?" is sufficient to preserve an

3

Although counsel and the court appeared to be discussing ordering a competency
evaluation, the court ultimately ordered a mental health evaluation pursuant to LC. § 19-2524. R
124.
8

objection to restraints during trial, Wright, supra, a request for an evaluation to determine the
extent of impairment is sufficient to preserve the question of whether the court erred in not
ordering an evaluation under I.C. §§ 18-210-18-212. See also, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
176-177, 95 S.Ct. 896, 906 (1975), holding that an "inartfully" drawn motion for a continuance
wherein counsel stated that the defendant was not of sound mind and should have a further
psychiatric examination" was sufficient to raise the issue of competence to stand trial.
Moreover, the discussions about whether Mr. Pulsifer could bear the costs of the
evaluation ordered indicate an intent to request and order a competency evaluation. Pursuant to
LC. § 18-211 (1 ), the cost of a competency evaluation is to be paid by the defendant. However,

the costs of mental health evaluations under LC. § 19-2524 are to be paid by the department of
health and welfare. LC. § 19-2524(6).
As the issue was preserved for review, an abuse of discretion review should be made.
And, for the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief, an abuse of discretion should be found, and
the conviction should be vacated.
C. In the Final Alternative. Relief Should be Granted Because the Failure to
Order a Competency Evaluation Violated Mr. Pulsifer's State and Federal
Constitutional Rights to Due Process
Failure to observe procedures to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted
while incompetent denies the due process right to a fair trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86
S.Ct. 836 (1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 172, 95 S.Ct. at 904; Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1988) (per curiam); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169-70, 128
S.Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008).
The state argues that no due process violation occurred here because "examining the

9

record as a whole, there is no indication that Pulsifer was unable to assist his defense counsel or
understand the nature of the proceedings against him." Respondent's Brief at page 7. To support
its argument, the state references various statements Mr. Pulsifer made at the plea and sentencing
hearings and Mr. Pulsifer's signature on the plea agreement and the guilty plea advisory.
Respondent's Brief at pages 8-10.
The state's argument overlooks the fact that a person can behave rationally, can be
oriented in time and place, can act logically and consistently, can be mentally alert and respond
appropriately and with understanding during colloquies with the court, can even participate
extensively in the trial proceedings and still lack the mental competency required to be tried and
sentenced. The state's line of reasoning was specifically rejected in Pate v. Robinson, supra:
The supreme Court of Illinois held that the evidence here was not sufficient to
require a hearing in light of the mental alertness and understanding displayed in
Robinson's 'colloquies' with the trial judge. But this reasoning offers no
justification for ignoring the uncontradicted testimony of Robinson's history of
pronounced irrational behavior. While Robinson's demeanor at trial might be
relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to
dispense with a hearing on that very issue.
383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. at 842, citations omitted. See also, Dusky, supra, holding that it is not
sufficient to consider only whether the defendant was oriented to time and place and had some
recollection of events. Further see, State v. Hawkins, supra, holding that even though Hawkins
had the ability to prepare and argue a defense, the other information before the district court
required a sua sponte assessment of competency.
While Mr. Pulsifer did sign documents and did respond to questioning from the court, it
is also true that his counsel and the LMSW who examined him pursuant to LC. § 19-2524,
alerted the court to the fact that Mr. Pulsifer had a head injury that could still be impacting him.

10

And, the LMSW specifically noted that he did not understand the meaning and consequences of
his plea.
Mr. Pulsifer's ability to sign documents and speak coherently with the com1, while
possibly relevant to an ultimate determination of his competency, cannot be relied upon to
dispense with a hearing on that very issue. Pate, supra.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, this Court should vacate Mr.
Pulsifer's conviction.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Micha
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